Wilhelm Schmidt's The Origin and Growth of Religion: Chapters 2 and 3

Wilhelm Schmidt was an early 20th century linguist who constructed the most powerful case for urmonotheismus. He laid out his case in his 12-volume magnum opus, Primitive Religion. His other book The Origin and Growth of Religion was meant to be a manual or a handbook to the overarching historical-cultural method, and has been translated in English.

Chapter 2 serves as a sketch of the major historical trends in the subject. The key points to stand out from the author's analysis:

1. Delineation of several phases of research, each characterized by its own candidate for what constituted the earliest religion. From 18th century onward, these candidates were:

- Nature-myths
- Fetishism
- Ancestor worship and/or ghost theory
- Animism (i.e. souls everywhere)
- Totemism
- Magic, or some undifferentiated mixture of magic and religion
- Discovery of "sky god", beliefs resembling monotheism in certain cultures.

The author, as a proponent of urmonotheismus, makes the interesting observation that the evolution of religion on earth took the exact opposite path of the chronological appearance of these candidates in the study of religion. This is not difficult to explain- the latest appearances in history would be the easiest to study and be detected the earliest, e.g. proponents of the nature-myths only ever studied written documents left by cultures, which leaves all presumably less developed cultures with more "primitive" beliefs from the analysis. This pattern would continue progressively until we know everything there is to know about anthropology of religion.

2. Emergence of the theory of evolution (or as the author calls it, evolutionism) as a deciding force in the path this line of research took. Evolutionism burdens the author working in this field with some unwarranted assumptions, like the proceeding of religions in cultures according to fixed laws of nature and from simpler to complex forms. Even one buys into that assumption, it becomes immensely difficult to understand what simplicity or complexity entails. There's a lot of room for arbitrary restrictions here, so the best course of action would be to just look at the data.

Incidentally, I do plan to read on evolutionary theories of religion later in my studies to understand their arguments, and see whether scientific facts from that field of investigation can narrow our hypotheses in any substantial way,

3. In reference to Lang, the author points out that there's no concrete method characterizing Lang's approach- something I agree with wholeheartedly. Indeed, all Lang does in his defense of primitive monotheism is just show that it's prevalent among some cultures. But without knowing whether his samples are representative, it's impossible to draw any conclusions either way. Interestingly, however, the author argues that him and his contemporaries are indeed in possession of a 'scientific' method to determine the identity of the primitive religion (and perhaps facts about later evolution), that can lay the cultures side by side and figure out which came first among them as part of a causal chain (which he will discuss further down the line). The author also addresses the question of sample representation head-on: specifically, he claims

a) His conclusions are based on all known religions and cultures of the world,
b) We now know about earlier religions in a width or depth sufficient enough to rule out future reversals of these conclusions.

If these two premises are solid, of course, that would mean that his conclusions are not based on cherry-picked data, and would remain robust in the face of future discoveries (i.e. not a "data of the gaps" argument). This reminds me of the following excerpt from Michael Behe's Darwin's Black Box:

[L]ike a neighbor's story about vanishing buttes, it has been difficult to evaluate whether the elusive and ill-defined small steps [which would plausibly lead to complexity] could exist... until now. With the advent of modem biochemistry we are now able to look at the rock-bottom level of life. We can now make an informed evaluation of whether the putative small steps required to produce large evolutionary changes can ever get small enough.

Chapter 3 explores the different efforts at exploring the question of origin of religions, with brief sections on the Greeks and Romans, the Christians, people in the middle ages, and during and after the Age of Discovery. For our immediate purposes, only the last bit is of relevance and significance- because the former approaches were based on so little data that their conclusions can be discounted safely. I'm reminded here of this excerpt from Moreland and Craig's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, where they talk about thoughts on religious diversity among Christian thinkers prior and posterior to the age of discovery:

[Christian] particularistic doctrine was just as scandalous in the polytheistic world of the Roman Empire as in contemporary Western culture. In time, however, the scandal receded, as Christianity grew to supplant the religions of Greece and Rome and became the official religion of the Roman Empire. Indeed, for medieval thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas, one of the marks of the true church was its catholicity, that is, its universality. To them it seemed incredible that the great edifice of the Christian church, filling all of civilization, should be founded on a falsehood. 

The demise of Christian particularism came with the so-called expansion of Europe, the three centuries of exploration and discovery from about 1450 until 1750. Through the travels and voyages of men like Marco Polo, Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Magellan, new civilizations and whole new worlds were discovered, which knew nothing of the Christian faith. The realization that much of the world lay outside the bounds of Christianity had a twofold impact on people’s religious thinking. First, it tended to relativize religious beliefs. It was seen that far from being the universal religion of mankind, Christianity was largely confined to Western Europe, a corner of the globe. No religion, it seemed, could make a claim to universal validity; each society seemed to have its own religion suited to its peculiar needs. [Emphasis mine]

(I'm not convinced that these discoveries leads to the conclusion at the end, by the way)

What might be of some tangential interest, however, is how proponents of particularist forms of religion explained the existence of other religious beliefs. These were some of their theories:

1. Demons (for some Christians, the spawn of fallen angels and men) have given rise to pagan beliefs
2. For the parts of pagan beliefs that agree with Biblical monotheism- they were borrowed from Judaism
3. Divine condescension- basically progressive revelation, God might have let "imperfect" beliefs subsist because such was concordant with the state of humanity back then.

Regarding 1, the hadith mention Satan deceiving people into polytheism, with Noah's community being the paradigm case. Some (weak?) narrations also mention Satan deceiving Amr ibn Luhayy into bringing in the Hubal idol from Syria to Makkah. Even if these reports were absent, however, given Islam's stance on Satan's role in misleading people from the true path, this fits nicely in Islam's weltanschauung.

2 can be expanded to more generally state "derived from" as opposed to "borrowed from"- meaning in addition to horizontal transfer of culture, pagan beliefs might even be degenerated forms of revealed religion. This is something Islam agrees with wholeheartedly, as its characterization of the prevalent beliefs among the Arabs is that it's a degeneration of the faith of Abraham. In fact, one of Islam's most powerful arguments for itself was that it's not a "new faith", but a reversal to a form of original religion that was revealed from God and the forefathers of its audience subscribed to. This argument was only possible on a premise of degeneration of the earlier faith. I think this fits in better with Islam than any other major religion, as Islam states revelations were sent to every people.

3 is also endorsed, to some extent, in Islam- there is a hadith which mention that the Prophet Moses (as) would be a follower of Muhammedan Islam if he were alive. This implies the Muhammedan religion is a "more perfect" version of Mosaic religion. Also, the Qur'an and the hadith mention earlier people engaging in practices that have been outlawed in Muhammedan Islam, like the Prophet Solomon's (as) making of statues. However, this is rather limited in its explanatory scope. I doubt it would be very relevant when we're trying to explain wayward beliefs about God or theology. Progressive revelation can't explain, for example, people believing in an anthropomorphic God. That consideration would become very relevant in discussions of anthropomorphism in primitive religious beliefs.

One other tidbit from this chapter- the author, himself a catholic priest, identifies Christianity as being absolute monotheism, but Islam as being fanatical monotheism. So he acknowledges the difference between the two. On the other hand, he cites ancient writers who argued for the truth of Christianity on the basis of the fact that it is monotheistic. I've heard this argument made before- a religion being true because it's monotheistic- the Muslim apologist Bassam Zawadi made it in one of his debates, and the Bengali author Ghulam Mustafa dedicates an entire chapter to this argument in his seerah book. I wonder if this argument has any promise, or how one might go about constructing it?

Review of Andrew Lang's The Making of Religion

Andrew Lang’s 1898 book, The Making of Religion, argues for the following theses:

1. The tribes of lower culture acquired their beliefs in “spiritual beings” from veridical experiences of the supernatural,
2. Monotheism is the first form of religion among humans,
3. The other forms of religion like animism, ‘departmental’ polytheism, etc have all been derived from a degeneration of this primitive monotheism.

Veridical experiences of the supernatural

The first half of the book takes up the first thesis. The author provides examples of paranormal phenomena and practices among different primitive cultures, often on the basis of what the author views as reliable testimony from educated, unbiased researchers. Intertwined with these examples are discussions of the phenomena in modern, well-studied, ‘scientific’ (and sometimes even experimental) contexts, which he furnishes to prove that these phenomena so indeed occur in nature. 

Based on these two semi-independent strands of discussion, he makes a two-fold argument for thesis 1:

1. If, based on ‘modern’ research, we find scientific/experimental evidence of these supernatural phenomena, then reports of the same phenomena in ‘primitive’ contexts should be an indication that their experiences of them are veridical as well (or at least it raises the prior probability of the phenomena in the latter context being veridical);
2. More importantly, many details associated with the phenomena, even ones that might seem insignificant, match up closely between primitive and modern contexts. This parallelism of information can only be explained if we assume both groups are experiencing the same things, and received their information from the same source.

To quote the author:

The best testimony for the truth of the reports as to actual beliefs in the facts is the undersigned coincidence of evidence from all ages and quarters. When the stories brought by travelers, ancient and modern, learned and unlearned, pious or sceptical, agree in the main, we have all the certainty that anthropology can offer.

This latter line of evidence has been pursued more extensively by modern researchers of the paranormal. The out-of-body researcher Jeffrey Long, for example, lists a set of phenomenological components that are common among people who experience a near-death experience, and these commonalities hold regardless of prior religious beliefs of the individual. The philosopher Stephen Braude makes this same point in his book Limits of Influence:

[T]here exist numerous collective eyewitness accounts of [supernatural] phenomena, and reports of unusual sorts of phenomena occurring on more than one occasion. Such accounts may be found in many cases of physical mediumship, poltergeist disturbances, and apparitions.

Moreover, as Gauld and Cornell's recent survey of poltergeist and haunting cases demonstrates, non experimental case reports frequently agree on peculiar and unexpected details, despite the fact that the reports are made independently of one another, and often under quite different social and cultural conditions (Gauld and Cornell, 1979). Among these details are: the slow and gentle trajectories of airborne objects, the apparent passage of levitated objects through walls and closed doors, and the poltergeist bombardment with human excrement. Since until recently victims of poltergeist disturbances have tended to be unfamiliar both with the literature on the subject (if any existed) and with other contemporaneous cases of the same kind, it seems to me that such convergence of independent testimony cannot easily be brushed aside. Furthermore, when close examination of poltergeist cases suggests strongly that those involved share no common underlying needs to experience or report phenomena of this sort (especially in their details), and in the absence of any reasonable proposals as to what such needs might be, we simply have to entertain seriously the hypothesis that the phenomena occurred largely as reported.

Responding to natural explanations based on some common, ‘universal’ psychological features of human beings that disposes all people to experience these phenomena in certain contexts, Braude writes:

Even if witnesses of ostensibly paranormal phenomena were biased or predisposed to see such things, this would not explain why the biased misperceptions or reports should be similar in so many peculiar details. One would need a rather elaborate psychological theory (to say the least) to explain why people of dissimilar backgrounds and cultures, with apparently no common needs to experience bizarre phenomena of any sort (much less the same sort), should, independently of one another, report (say) 'raining' stones inside a house or the intense heat of apports.

Lang focuses on five kinds of supernatural or paranormal phenomena in the first half of his book: clairvoyance, crystal-gazing, veridical ‘hallucinations’ of living individuals, demon possessions, and fetishism or objects acting autonomously against the laws of nature, presumably due to spirit activity. The fact that such a wide array of events is found to be common among modern, ‘scientific’ contexts as well as in a large number of ‘primitive’ cultures all across the world is the key fodder for his second argument. In addition, he also mentions some ‘peculiar’ similarities (the sort that Braude alludes to) between these reports, regardless of context- like gazing into a ‘smooth deep’ to foretell events at a distance, be that the modern-day crystal, or a hole filled with water, blood, ink, etc. Another peculiar example is the need to tie up the ‘shaman’ during possession by a spirit.

Of course, the argument for veridicality of this report overlaps with a discussion on the epistemology of testimony, and whether such non-experimental reports are of scientific merit. I believe Braude settles this question pretty exhaustively in his books Limits of Influence and The Gold Leaf Lady.

Lang’s conclusion from this part of the discussion follows rather naturally- the universal human belief in the ‘supernatural’ is best explained by positing the human exposure to veridical supernatural phenomena. This exposure, says the author, is due both to the existence of non-human rational beings, as well as certain faculties among humans not within the current limits of science.

Urmonotheismus: Original monotheism

The second half of the book takes up the latter two theses. A running theme of the book is the author’s rebuttals of shoddy anthropological scholarship, especially from the likes of Herbert Spencer and Thomas Henry Huxley, who either deny the existence of any religion among tribes of lower culture, or deny the existence of any monotheistic beliefs among them (or attribute such beliefs to Christian or Islamic missionary influence), or at least deny the link between religious and moral beliefs among them. The author mostly responds to these claims by citing example after example from the anthropology literature as empirical disproof.

With this out of the way, the author dedicates four chapters to provide substantial evidence for belief in a “High God”, the recipient of exclusive worship, and the source of moral law, among a large number of tribes in Australia, Africa, and the Americas. Interspersed in this material is his rebuttal to the theory, most famously propounded by the anthropologist Edward Tylor, that these beliefs evolved out of prior beliefs of ancestor-worship or spirit-worship, or other forms of animism. Lang takes Tylor to task first for not discussing the monotheistic beliefs in these cultures in any significant detail. As for the specific claim of later evolution of monotheism, the author furnishes three counter-arguments:

1. Ancestor-worship could not have led to these beliefs, for the simple fact that many of these tribes didn’t have chiefs or heads of the tribe, i.e. an ancestor to deify. In many cases, they didn’t even remember their names.
2. As for the idea of God developing out of a belief ‘spirits’ or ‘ghosts’, the author points out that in most tribes with monotheism, God is not identified as a ‘spirit’- but rather as an ontologically more basic concept, which he dubs an ‘indeterminate immortal being’. The idea of a spirit or ghost, in other words, is more complex than the primitive idea of God.
3. Most importantly, for the ghost or ancestor worship theory, it requires the deity to have died at one point. But across virtually all primitive mythologies, the author argues, death and disease are seen to be later entrants to the world. Initially, their gods or God were immortal and lived that way, but then to some reason- a mistake by a human being, often- disease or death came into this world. For a concept of God that is necessarily prior to death, it is incredibly difficult to see how it could have evolved from a virtually contradictory concept- that of an ancestor passing away, and then divinity being passed to its departed soul.

Degeneration theory

In addition to reporting the existence of monotheistic beliefs among these people with the lowest material culture, the author also observes a pervasive belief in an ignored, neglected, or “set to the side” deity in many polytheistic or nearly polytheistic cultures, which are almost always more materially advanced. In fact, complex forms of polytheism and the belief in a “High” creator, who is virtually ignored in the culture, is seen to coexist commonly. This provides the substrate for the third thesis: a theory of degeneration from monotheism to polytheism. Since monotheistic beliefs exist in people of the least developed cultural forms, and since these could not have been evolved out of prior polytheistic beliefs, the author moves to consider whether the latter could have somehow supplanted the former in many cases. His argument here rests on two lines of evidence:

1. In all tribes with an admixture of monotheistic and polytheistic beliefs, the myth and ‘theology’ surrounding the polytheistic deities are very rich and complex, while the theology of the ‘High’ deity is very bare-boned. Coupled with the fact that the polytheism could not have given rise to monotheism for considerations laid out above, this suggests, to the author’s mind, that the latter is the older theory, and has been progressively supplanted by the former.
2. More importantly, the author argues for the eminent plausibility of this ‘supplanting’ theory: For any people, a serviceable god would be more ‘useful’ than the God of theism. A monotheistic deity cannot be ‘propitiated’ with sacrifice, or made to serve the everyday whims of the community. More accessible polytheistic deities, however, could be taken advantage of in just such a way.

To quote the author:

A moral creator is in need of no gifts, and opposed to lust and mischief, will not help a man with love-spells, or with malevolent ‘sendings’ of disease by witchcraft; will not favour one man above his neighbour, or one tribe above its rivals, as a reward for sacrifice which he does not accept, or as constrained by charms which do not touch his omnipotence. Ghosts and ghost-gods, on the other hand, in need of food and blood, afraid of spells and binding charms, are a corrupt, but, to a man, a useful constituency. Man being what he is, man was certain to ‘go a whoring’ after practically useful ghosts, ghost-gods, and fetishes which he could keep in his wallet or medicine bag. For these he was sure, in the long run, first to neglect his idea of his Creator; next, perhaps, to reckon Him as only one, if the highest, of the venal rabble of spirits or deities, and to sacrifice to Him, as to them. And this is exactly what happened! If we are not to call it ‘degeneration’, what are we to call it?

The author also makes an argument inspired by Biblical history: the entire story of the Hebrew Bible is God trying to protect the Israelites from falling into polytheism time and time against. The fact that Israel manages to maintain monotheism at all is an anomaly. This proves degeneration from monotheism to polytheism is the natural course of things: there’s no reason why things should be different in case of other tribes.

Assessment

The first small thing to notice is Lang’s first thesis doesn’t seem to have any bearing on the other two, or vice versa. The author does try to posit a connection in the conclusion, but it’s somewhat contrived, and it does seem to me that the two sets of theses (1 vs 2 and 3) would stand or fall on their own right.

As for 1, this would be useful in building a positive case for veridical paranormal experiences: since the more diverse the communities are in which such phenomena are repeated, the greater their evidential strength. This also reinforces the argument from the universality of religion in all of human experience to religion coming ‘naturally’ to men (it being part of our fitra, a Muslim would say), as the veridicality of this class of events, proven by modern investigations as well as analytic inquiries into older reports, demonstrate the ontological basis and mode of acquisition of these beliefs. Since this field has been actively pursued, using the sharper tools of analytic philosophy, in more recent times, I don’t see these conclusions facing much rational resistance.

The other two theses are a different story, for the simple fact that origin of religion is not a widely researched field, and the hypothesis of urmonotheismus is not actively pursued today. Lang’s case ultimately rests on these premises:

1. The tribes with the lowest cultural forms show monotheistic beliefs.
2. The tribes with higher cultural forms show a mixture of polytheistic and “neglected” monotheistic beliefs. Alternatively, there’s a noticeable correlation between increase in cultural sophistication with polytheistic beliefs and neglect of monotheistic beliefs.
3. Monotheistic beliefs are conceptually such that they could not have been derived from polytheistic ones, given the background assumptions associated with both.

Lang’s book came out in 1898, so the question boils down to whether these premises would be still borne out by the data, after over a century of new research and writing on the topic. It’s important to note that, the author, by his own admission, doesn’t carry out a survey- he doesn’t claim that the examples he chooses are representative samples from the set of lower material cultures. A large number of examples still might not constitute a representative sample. As such, the book’s approach isn’t really scientific. The key benefit to take away from the book would be: It’s a good primer on anthropology of religion, particularly the urmonotheismus hypothesis; and it lays out the general structure of how one should go about trying to defend, or evaluate, the hypothesis.